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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense jus-
fice."26
The court cast aside the ancient technical distinctions between libel
and slander based upon permanence of form and based its decision on
the capacity for harm. In so doing, the court has taken a great stride
forward in adapting the common law to the changing nature of human
affairs.
MAX D. BALLINGER
,Torts--Res Ipsa Loquitur-Malpractice Cases
The plaintiff's arm was fractured during electro-shock treatment ad-
ministered by the defendant psychiatrist. His suit for damages was on
two different theories: breach of warranty and negligence. Defendant
psychiatrist moved for summary judgment. The court in Johnston v.
Rodis1 granted the motion.
The court disposed of the breach of warranty theory by saying, "An
expression of opinion on the part of a physician that a particular course
of treatment is safe, does not constitute a warranty . . . . [H]e is
answerable only for negligence."
'2
The negligence theory also failed as the court also held that no spe-
cific negligence was charged and that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.
In order to have the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied, the plaintiff
must show the existence of three conditions. 3 The accident or injury
must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence, 4 there must be a reasonable inference that the
defendant is responsible for the negligence which caused the injury,6
and it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the plaintiff.6  The malpractice cases in which plaintiffs
-"Ibid., quoting from Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354-55, 102 N.E.2d 691,
694 (1951).
1151 F. Supp. 345 (D.C. 1957), rev'd, -F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1958). The court
reversed on the warranty theory but upheld the district court on the negligence
theory and agreed that res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.
2 Id. at 348.
'PRossER, TORTS § 42 (2d ed. 1955).
' Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E2d 242 (1941) (res ipsa loquitur
applied where gauze sponge was left buried in plaintiff's hip).
"The control at one time or another of one or more of the various agencies
or instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of
every defendant or of his employees or temporary servants. This we think places
on them the burden of initial explanation." Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486,
492, 154 P.2d 690 (1944) (non-suit reversed); Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949) (on re-trial judgment for plaintiff against all
defendants affirmed, defendants offered no explanation of injury). See also Arm-
strong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P.2d 740 (1935) (gauze sponge left in
abdominal cavity following Caesarean section); PROSsER, ToRTs § 42 (2d ed.
1955).
" Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 286, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (injury while patient
was unconscious).
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have relied on res ispa loquitur divide into two main groups. There
are "those in which the action is based solely upon the unsuccessful or
bad result of the diagnosis or treatment,7 and those in which the action
is based on specific acts by or omission of the physician or surgeon."
8
In the former group there is generally no recovery, while in the latter,
res ipsa loquitur is frequently applied by the courts.
Within the latter group, the application of res ipsa loquitur is gen-
erally limited to some variation of two basic fact situations. One sit-
uation arises where a foreign object left in the body of the plaintiff
causes the injury. The other is where there is a "distinct injury to a
healthy part of the body not the subject of treatment nor within the
area covered by the operation."'1
In the principal case the court, in following the common law of
Maryland, stated that "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be
invoked in an action for malpractice against a physician or surgeon,""
and that the only exception to the above rule "consists of cases where
the undesirable result is such that it is evident even to a layman and
could not have occurred except for the doctor's negligence."' 12 The
stated exception is a not uncommon test used by those courts which
ostensibly support the doctrine in malpractice cases to determine
whether res ipsa loquitur will apply in the particular case.'8 It seems
on close analysis that the court in the principal case, while outwardly
rejecting the doctrine in actions for malpractice, might actually apply
it: (1) where a foreign object left in the body caused the injury, and
(2) where the injury was to a healthy part of the body not involved in
treatment.
In addition to Bettigole v. Diener,.4 on which the court relied in the
instant case as stating the law in Maryland, the court also leaned
heavily on two cases on all fours with the principal case. In Farber v.
Lippard v. Johnson, 215 N.C. 384, 1 S.E.2d 889 (1939) (administration of local
anesthetic); Davis v. Pittman, 212 N.C. 680, 194 S.E. 97 (1937) (X-ray burn);
see Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1250 (1923), stating that "the general practitioner of
medicine or of surgery does not, in the absence of his special contract, impliedly
warrant the success of his treatment or operation, but does guarantee to possess
and carefully to apply such professional skill and learning as are ordinarily
possessed by general medical practitioners in the locality in which he practices."
I Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941); Pendergraft
v. Royster, 203 N.C. 384, 166 S.E. 285 (1932) (broken glass left in woman's
body after operation) ; Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1265 (1946).
'Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941), 19 N.C.L. REv.
617. See also Meredith, Responsibility of Surgeons, 34 CAN. B. Ray. 1192 (1956).
21 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). See also Notes, 18
Miss. L.J. 448 (1947), 9 U. DEr. L.J. 51 (1945), 63 HARv. L. Rav. 643 (1950).
11 151 F. Supp. at 347. 12 Id. at 348.
"1 See Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 510, 254 P.2d 520, 524 (1953).
14210 Md. 537, 124 A.2d 265 (1956) (plaintiff suffered facial paralysis due to
nerve damage following a mastoidectomy in which the facial nerve was. exposed,.
verdict directed for defendant).
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Olkon' 5 and Quinley v. Cooke,16 electro-shock treatment resulted in
fractures and res ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable. In considering
these two cases, the reason for not applying the doctrine becomes ap-
parent. In both cases defendant introduced evidence on trial tending to
negate the condition that the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence.' 7 In both cases
expert testimony brought out the fact that fractures were "calculated
risks of the treatment"'- which involved the entire body, and that such
accidents do happen without negligence. It is worthy of mention that
the Bettigole case and all the cases therein cited'0 as authority to sup-
port the result involved fact situations falling within the first general
group of cases where the action was based solely on the bad result of
treatment and in which it is doubtful that any court would apply the
doctrine.2 0
It appears that no malpractice case has reached the North Carolina
Supreme Court since 1941 in which res ispa loquitur was relied on and
applied. To date, this bears out the prediction in this Law Review2 '
that the formula announced in Covington v. James2 2 probably would
not be widely extended. This formula would allow the application of
res ipsa loquitur "in any case where the result reached was 'grotesquely
contrary to all human experience.' ",23 Since then, the doctrine has been
mentioned in several opinions involving malpractice, but in none of
these opinions does it appear that the plaintiff expressly relied on it,
and it was ruled inapplicable in all cases.24
JEAN M. LUCK
1 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953).
1 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S.W.2d 992 (1946).
17 25 Cal. 2d at 489, 154 P.2d at 689.
18 40 Cal. 2d at 511, 254 P.2d at 525.
" State v. Baltimore Eye, Ear, and Throat Hospital, 177 Md. 517, 10 A.2d
(1940) (patient died of a blood clot on the lungs following a tonsillectomy, verdict
directed for defendant) ; Fink v. Steele, 166 Md. 354, 171 At. 49 (1934) (dentist
filled a tooth which later abscessed, was entitled to a directed verdict) ; Street v.
Hodgson, 139 Md. 137, 115 At. 27 (1921) (plaintiff burned by X-ray, no infer-
ence of negligence from burn alone); Augalo v. Hallar, 137 Md. 227, 112 Atl. 179
(1920) (dentist attempted to remove roots of tooth, plaintiff's infected jaw be-
came worse) ; Miller v. Leib, 109 Md. 414, 72 At. 466 (1909) (plaintiff alleged
specific negligence) ; State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 Atl. 382 (1889)
(woman operated on for breast cancer later died).
Cf. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955) (metal sliver
lodged near the base of plaintiff's neck, nerve injured in removal caused loss of
use of one hand) ; Hawkins v. McCain, 239 N.C. 160, 79 S.E.2d 493 (1953) (plain-
tiff while being treated for a skin condition through the use of arsensic developed
other symptoms alleged to be caused by arsenic) ; Nance v. Hitch, 238 N.C. 1,
76 S.E.2d 461 (1953) (X-ray burn). In none of the above cases was res ipsa
loquitur found applicable.
"Note, 19 N.C.L. REV. 617 (1941). 2214 N.C. 71, 197 S.E. 701 (1938).
"2 Note, 19 N.C.L. Ray. 617, 619 (1941) quoting 214 N.C. at 76, 197 S.E. at
701.
" See cases cited note 20 supra.
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